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The East African Campaign refers to the battles fought in East Africa during World War II. The battles of this campaign were fought between the forces of the British Empire, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and several allies on one side and the forces of the Italian Empire on the other. This campaign was one of the African campaigns of World War II.
This campaign fell under the British Middle East Command. The vast majority of the British allied forces involved were from British Commonwealth nations. The Commonwealth forces included troops from the Sudan, British Somaliland, British East Africa, the Indian Empire, South Africa, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and British West Africa (Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia). There was even a small commando unit from the British Mandate of Palestine. In addition to the British and Commonwealth forces, there were Ethiopian irregular forces, Free French forces, and Free Belgian forces.
The Italian forces included Italian nationals, East African colonials (Eritreans, Abyssinians, and Somali Dubats), and even a small number of German volunteers (the German Motorized Company). The majority of the Italian forces were East African colonials led by Italian officers.
On 9 May 1936, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini proclaimed his "Italian East African Empire" (Africa Orientale Italiana, AOI). Mussolini's "Italian East African Empire" was formed from the newly-occupied Ethiopia and the Italian colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. Italy did not come by its East African colony easily. During the First Italo-Abyssinian War from 1895 to 1896, Italy was thwarted in its colonial ambitions when the forces of Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia soundly defeated the Italian Royal Army (Regio Esercito) at the Battle of Adowa. During the Second Italo-Abyssinian War from 1935 to 1936, the Italians again invaded Ethiopia and, by using weapons like poison gas, were finally able to defeat the Ethiopians.
While the Kingdom of Egypt remained neutral during World War II, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 allowed the military forces of the United Kingdom to occupy Egypt in defense of the Suez Canal. At this time, the Kingdom of Egypt included the Sudan. However, the Sudan was a condominium between Egypt and the United Kingdom known as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
On 10 June 1940, when Mussolini entered World War II against the British and the French, the Italian forces in Africa became a potential threat to British supply routes along the Red Sea and through the Suez Canal. While Egypt and the Suez Canal, were Mussolini's obvious primary targets, an Italian invasion of either French Somaliland or British Somaliland were reasonable choices too. But Mussolini initially looked past both of these small, isolated colonies and, instead, looked forward to propaganda triumphs in the Sudan and British East Africa (Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda).
However, the Italian Central Command (Commando Centrale) was planning for a war starting after 1942. In the summer of 1940, they were not prepared for a prolonged war or to occupy extensive areas of the African continent.[4]
In the early part of the war, British General Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East Command, had a total of 86,000 British and Commonwealth troops at his disposal to handle potential conflicts in Libya, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and East Africa. Worse, his forces were spread out in Egypt, Palestine, the Sudan, British Somaliland, Kenya, and several other locations. Faced with forces spaced out along the enemy frontiers at intervals of about eight men to the mile, Wavell resolved to fight the Italians with delaying actions at the main posts and hope for the best. The delaying actions, bolstered by aggressive raids into Italian territory, were fought with skill and spirit. British and Commonwealth reinforcements only started to appear in significant numbers from July 1940 onwards.
Short of men, Wavell needed all of the local support he could find. One answer was Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia. The deposed emperor had been living in England ever since the Italians invaded his country in 1936 during the Second Italo-Abyssinian War.
In July, the British government recognised Emperor Selassie and promised to help him to reclaim his throne. But, before July, related activities were already taking place.
On 13 June, only three days after Mussolini declared war against Britain and France, a "Mr. Strong" took off in a Short Sunderland flying boat from Poole Harbour on the south coast of England. Emperor Selassie, alias Mr. Strong, was headed home. On 25 June, Mr. Strong arrived in Alexandria, Egypt. Seven days later, as "Mr. Smith," he flew to Khartoum in the Sudan. In Khartoum, Mr. Smith met Lieutenant-General William Platt. Emperor Selassie and Platt discussed plans to free Ethiopia from Italian rule.[5]
At the end of October 1940, because of the increasing Axis threat in the Middle East, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden convened a conference in Khartoum. In attendance were Emperor Selassie, South African General Jan Smuts (who held an advisory brief for the region with Winston Churchill), the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East Command, Archibald Wavell and the senior military commanders in East Africa including Lieutenant-General Platt and Lieutenant-General Cunningham. The general plan of attack, including the use of Ethiopian irregular forces, was agreed upon at this conference.[6]
In November 1940, the British and Commonwealth forces received an incredible intelligence advantage. The government code and cypher school at Bletchley Park broke the high grade cypher of the Italian Royal Army (Regio Esercito) in East Africa. Later, during the same month, the replacement cypher for the Italian Royal Air Force (Regia Aeronautica) was broken by the Combined Bureau, Middle East (CBME). From this point on, the commanders-in-chief in Cairo knew Italian plans as soon as they were issued.[7]
Amedeo, Duke of Aosta was the Viceroy and Governor-General of Italian East Africa (Africa Orientale Italiana, or AOI). He had between 250,000 and 280,000 Italian troops available to him. On 10 June 1940, the Italians were organized in four command sectors: the Northern Sector (the area near Asmara, Eritrea), the Southern Sector (Jimma, Ethiopia), the Eastern Sector (near border with French Somaliland and British Somaliland), and the Giuba Sector (southern Somalia near Kismayo, Italian Somaliland). Lieutenant-General Luigi Frusci commanded the Northern Sector. General Pietro Gazzera commanded the Southern Sector. General Guglielmo Nasi commanded the Eastern Sector. Lieutenant-General Carlo De Simone commanded the Giuba Sector. The Duke of Aosta commanded from Addis Ababa in Ethiopia.
The Duke of Aosta's command included two Italian infantry divisions: The 40th Infantry Division "Hunters of Africa" (Cacciatori d'Africa) and the 65th Infantry Division "Savoy Grenadiers" (Granatieri di Savoia). The Italians also had one battalion of elite mountain troops (Alpini), one battalion of highly-mobile infantry (Bersaglieri), numerous Fascist paramilitary Blackshirts (Camice Nere) battalions, Security Volunteer Militia (Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale, or MVSN) Colonial Militia, and other smaller units.
Most of the Italian troops in East Africa (about 70%) were local East African askaris. While the askaris of the regular Eritrean battalions of the "Royal Corps of Colonial Troops" (Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali) were amongst the best Italian units in East Africa, the majority of the colonial troops in Italian East Africa were recruited, trained, and equipped to do no more than maintain order in the colony. The Somali Dubats recruited from border tribesmen provided useful light infantry and skirmishers but the irregular bande were much less effective. Ethiopian askaris and irregulars, recruited during the brief Italian occupation, deserted in large numbers after the outbreak of war. The Royal Corps of Colonial Troops included horse mounted Eritrean cavalry known as "Falcon Feathers" (Penne di Falcon). On one occasion a squadron of these horsemen charged British and Commonwealth troops throwing small hand grenades from the saddle.
Equipment for the Italian ground forces in East Africa was a mixed bag. The forces were equipped with about 3,300 machine guns, 24 M11/39 tanks, a large number of L3/35 tankettes, 126 armored cars and 813 pieces of assorted artillery. The most common Italian rifle in East Africa was the Carcano Mod. 91. However, the Italian faced problems with isolation of the East Africa, with very little chance for reinforcements or resupply, leading to problems especially with ammunition.
Another problem that afflicted the Italian forces was the lack of medicine for diseases endemic to the Horn of Africa area. Chief among thes diseases was malaria. It is estimated that nearly one-quarter of the Italians troops defending Amba Alagi in April 1941 had malaria during the siege. Unfortunately, the Italians at Amba Alagi had no medicine for malaria, the Italian medicine at the time being all but gone during the last months of fighting in 1941. Even the commander of Amba Alagi, the Duke of Aosta, was himself afflicted with malaria during the siege. He died of tuberculosis and malaria on 3 March 1942, a few months after his surrender.
Initially, the British and Commonwealth forces in East Africa amounted to about 30,000 men under Lieutenant-General William Platt in the Sudan, Lieutenant-General Alan Cunningham in British East Africa, and Colonel Arthur Reginald Chater in British Somaliland. The British and Commonwealth forces were slightly better equipped than the Italians, and had access to resupply and reinforcements. However, they were vastly outnumbered by the Italian forces available in Italian East Africa . To make matters worse for the British, the Italians had at least another 208,000 men (fourteen divisions) available in Libya.
On 10 June 1940, in all of the Sudan, prior to the arrival of the Indian 4th Infantry Division and Indian 5th Infantry Division, Platt had only three infantry battalions (which were absorbed into the under-strength 5th Indian Division when it arrived)[8] and the machine-gun companies of the Sudan Defence Force. The three battalions were the 1st Battalion Worcestershire Regiment, the 1st Battalion Essex Regiment and the 2nd Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment which in mid-September became part of Indian 29th, 10th and 9th Infantry Brigades respectively.
In Kenya, the King's African Rifles (KAR) was composed of two brigade-strength units organized as a "Northern Brigade" and a "Southern Brigade." In 1938, the combined strength of both units amounted to 94 officers, 60 non-commissioned officers, and 2,821 African other ranks. After the outbreak of war, these units provided the trained nucleus for the rapid expansion of the KAR. By March 1940, the strength of the KAR had reached 883 officers, 1,374 non-commissioned officers, and 20,026 African other ranks. The size of a KAR battalion was established at 36 officers, 44 non-commissioned officers and other ranks, and 1,050 African other ranks.[9]
Initially the KAR deployed as the 1st East African Infantry Brigade and the 2nd East African Infantry Brigade. The first brigade was responsible for coastal defense and the second was responsible for the defense of the interior. By the end of July, two additional East African brigades were formed, the 3rd East African Infantry Brigade and the 6th East African Infantry Brigade. Initially a Coastal Division and a Northern Frontier District Division were planned. But, instead, the 11th African Division and the 12th African Division were formed.[9]
On 1 June, the first South African unit arrived in Mombasa, Kenya. By the end of July, the 1st South African Infantry Brigade Group joined the first unit. On 13 August, the 1st South African Division was formed. This division included the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Infantry Brigade Groups. By the end of the year, approximately 27,000 South Africans were serving in East Africa. The South Africans were either in the 1st South African Division, the 11th African Division, or the 12th African Division. Each South African brigade group consisted of three rifle battalions, an armored car company, and supporting signal, engineer, and medical units.[10]
By July, under the terms of a war contingency plan, two brigades were provided on rotation for service in Kenya by the "Royal West African Frontier Force." One brigade was from the Gold Coast the 2nd (West Africa) Infantry Brigade, (Ghana) and one brigade the 1st (West Africa) Infantry Brigade was from Nigeria. The Nigerian brigade, together with two East African brigades (the KAR brigades) and some South Africans, formed 11th African Division. The 12th African Division had a similar formation with the Ghanaian brigade taking the place of the Nigerian brigade.[9]
In British Somaliland, Chater commanded the Somaliland Camel Corps and the re-inforcements that were trickling in. At the outbreak of hostilities, the camel corps had a total of 1,475 men to defend the colony. This number also includes a battalion of the Northern Rhodesian Regiment.
A significant aspect of the Allied campaign to retake Ethiopia were Ethiopian irregular forces referred to by the British as "patriots" (or Arbegnoch). Wavell expected that these forces would be able to tie down large numbers of Italian units throughout the colony, although Platt in Khartoum did not believe that Hailie Selassie had the support of the majority of the people and was lukewarm towards providing support to the patriot groups.[11] From August 1940 Mission 101 under Colonel Daniel Sandford had been operating successfully in Gojjam province. Its role was to send "Operational Centres" - small groups of officers and NCOs - to supply arms and training to the Ethiopian patriots and coordinate attacks on Italian forces. Sandford, after serving with distinction in World War I, had spent the rest of his career in Ethiopia and the Sudan and had become a close friend and adviser to Hailie Selassie.[12]
Hailie Selassie with the encouragement of Sandford had arrived in Khartoum in July 1940 to a cold reception from Platt.[12] However, Anthony Eden's Khartoum conference in October agreed to boost supplies and support to the Ethiopian irregular forces.[13] Part of the increased support saw the posting in early November of Major Orde Wingate (who had spent five inter-war years with the Sudan Defence Force and was later to gain fame in Burma with the Chindits) to Khartoum as a staff officer with the brief of liaising between Platt, Mission 101 and the Emperor.[11] Here he impressed Hailie Selassie with his drive and enthusiasm.
However, Platt's poor opinion of Hailie Selassie, Sandford, and Wingate meant that he paid little attention to the operation and the resulting lack of clear areas of responsibility and chains of command (together with Wingate's naturally abrasive manner) meant that for the whole campaign there was friction and animosity between Wingate and the other commanders.[14]
Wingate formulated a plan for action in Ethiopia which he presented to Wavell and senior staff in Cairo in early December 1940. The plan included the formation of a small regular force under Wingate to act as a spearhead for military operations in Gojjam. He argued that:
To raise a revolt you must send in a Corps d'Elite to do exploits and not just as peddlers of war material and cash ... A thousand resolute and well-armed men can paralyse 10,000[15]
This force, was named Gideon Force, after the biblical judge Gideon, and was composed of the Frontier battalion from the Sudan Defence Force and the 2nd Ethiopian Battalion. These forces were equipped with four 3-inch mortars (in place of artillery) and 15,000 camels to provide transport and carry supplies. Although he did not formally take command until 6 February 1941, Windgate set off with Gideon Force into Gojjam in January 1941.[16]
Gideon Force was able to travel relatively freely throughout the countryside. At any time during its brief history, the Italian East African Empire was only nominally under Italian control. It is estimated that as much as one third of Ethiopia remained under the control of Ethiopian nobles.[17]
The Italians had not endeared themselves to the Ethiopians. On 22 May 1936, when General Rodolfo Graziani was made Viceroy of Ethiopia, the Italians may have possibly chosen the man least likely to pacify the country. On 6 June, Mussolini cabled Graziani and indicated: "All rebels captured are to be shot." This gave the new Viceroy, infamous for his pacification of Libya, all the power he needed.[18] Soon, Graziani's reputation for brutal repression earned him the title: "the Butcher of Ethiopia." Amedeo, the Duke of Aosta, replaced Graziani as Viceroy in 1937. It was generally conceded that he was a vast improvement over Graziani. But he was unable to undo much of the damage Graziani's brutality had already done.
For their part, the Ethiopian patriots gave the Italian troops every reason to fear losing to them. The Ethiopians did not often take prisoners.[17]
Very important to the success of the operations in north west Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie I crossed the border from Sudan to join the force of Ethiopian patriots. Sizeable patriot forces were already concentrated in the provinces of Gojjam, Shoa, Gimma, Galla-Sidama, and Harage. [19]
ln June 1940, the Italian Royal Air Force (Regia Aeronautica Italia) in East Africa had between two-hundred and three-hundred combat ready aircraft (see Italian East Africa Air Command). While some of these aircraft were outdated, in relative terms these were some of the best aircraft available to either side in East Africa in 1940. The Italians had Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 and Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 bombers and Fiat CR-42 fighters. In addition, the Italian aircraft were often based at better airfields than their British and Commonwealth counter-parts. When the war began, Italian pilots were relatively well trained and confident of their abilities. But, cut off from Italy as they were, problems with lack of fuel, munitions, spare parts, and replacements eventually wore the Italian air capability down.
The roughly one-hundred aircraft available to the British and Commonwealth forces at the beginning of the campaign were dispersed as follows: In the north (Sudan) were two Royal Air Force (RAF) bomber squadrons at Port Sudan (one of these squadron was equipped with obsolete aircraft) and the RAF Army Co-operation Squadron on the Sudan frontier. In the south (Kenya) were No. 12 Bomber Squadron of the South African Air Force (SAAF) (equipped with Junkers Ju 86 bombers), No. 11 Bomber Squadron of the SAAF (equipped with Fairey Battles), No. 40 Army Co-operation Squadron SAAF (equipped with Hawker Hartebees), No. 2 Fighter Squadron, SAAF (equipped with Hawker Furies), and No. 237 (Southern Rhodesian) Army Co-operation Squadron (equipped with Hawker Hardys).
Unlike the Italians, the aircraft available to the British and Commonwealth forces got better with time. But, as can be seen above, much of the equipment initially available tended to be older and slower. Even so, the British and Commonwealth forces managed to make do with what they had. The South Africans even pressed an old Valencia biplane into service as a bomber.[20]
The Regia Marina (Royal Navy) maintained presence in the Red Sea region with its "Red Sea Flotilla". Most vessels were stationed in the port of Massawa in the Italian colony of Eritrea. However, lesser port facilities existed at Mogadishu in Italian Somaliland and also at Assab in Eritrea. The Red Sea Flotilla included seven destroyers organized into two squadrons, five motor torpedo boats (MTB, or in Italian; Motoscafo Armato Silurante, MAS) organized into one squadron together with eight submarines organized into two squadons.
The Italian naval squadrons were viewed by the British as a threat to Allied convoys heading from the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea.[21] But, as Italian fuel supplies in Massawa dwindled, so did the Italian fleet's opportunity for offensive action in the Red Sea.
The Red Sea Flotilla and its homeport of Massawa did however represent a link between Axis occupied Europe and the naval facilities located in the concession zone in Tientsin in China. These Chinese facilities were maintained by Italy.
The British Eastern Fleet faced the Italian Red Sea Flotilla. Until World War II, the Indian Ocean had been considered a "British lake". The Indian Ocean was ringed by significant British and Commonwealth possessions. Much of the strategic supplies needed by the United Kingdom in both peace and war had to pass across the Indian Ocean. These included: Persian oil, Malayan rubber, Indian tea, and Australian and New Zealand foodstuffs. In war, Britain relied upon the loyalty and manpower of Australia and New Zealand and these had to be transported. Safe passage for British cargo ships was critical.
Despite this, the Royal Navy had tended to station its older ships in the east and used the China Station and the Far East Station as sources of reinforcements for other theatres. Even when gravely threatened, the Eastern Fleet largely consisted of older capital ships that had been deemed too slow or too vulnerable to be of use in the Atlantic Ocean or the Mediterranean Sea.
Starting in June 1940, the Italians tested the resolve of the British and Commonwealth forces along the borders of the Sudan and Kenya and in the shipping lanes of the Red Sea.
On 13 June, early in the morning, three Italian Caproni bombers appeared and bombed the Rhodesian air base at the fort located at Wajir in Kenya. The Rhodesian aircraft were still warming up and preparing to take-off on a dawn patrol. The Capronis bombed the fort, the landing-ground, and nearby housing. The King's African Rifles (KAR), then garrisoning the fort, lost four killed and eleven wounded. Two Rhodesian aircraft were badly damaged and a large dump of aviation fuel was set on fire. Following this, the air base at Wajir received regular visits from the Italians every second or third day and the Rhodesian pilots were made to realize the significant shortcomings in speed and fire-power of the Hawker Hardys they themselves flew.
At dawn on 17 June, the Rhodesians struck back and supported a successful raid by the KAR on the Italian desert outpost of El Wak in Italian Somaliland, some ninety miles northeast of Wajir. The Rhodesians bombed and set alight the thatched mud huts and generally harassed the enemy troops. But, since the main fighting at that time was centered around Italian advances towards Moyale in Kenya, the Rhodesians concentrated on that town. In conjunction with the South African Air Force, the Rhodesians undertook the task of reconnaissance and bombing in that disputed area.
Early in July, Italian forces in Eritrea crossed the Sudanese border and forced the small British garrison holding the railway junction at Kassala to withdraw. The Italians also seized the small British fort at Gallabat, just over the border from Metemma, some 200 miles (320 km) to the south of Kassala. Even the villages of Ghezzan, Kurmuk and Dumbode on the Blue Nile were conquered. Having taken Kassala and Gallabat, however, the Italians decided to venture no further in the Sudan -- because of lack of fuel -- and they proceeded to fortify Kassala with anti-tank defences, machine-gun posts, and strong-points. Ultimately, the Italians established a brigade-strong garrison at Kassala.
In Kenya, after heavy fighting, the Italians occupied "Fort Harrington" in Moyale. At the end of July, Italian forces reached Debel and Buna. These small villages, nearly one-hundred kilometers from the Ethiopian-Kenyan border, were to be the deepest points inside Kenya reached by the Italian army.
In the first days of August, an Italian force of irregular Eritreans raided,Port Sudan[22] as a prelude to the Italian campaign to conquer British Somaliland.
Initially, an Italian force was assembled to capture the port city of Djibouti, the major French base in French Somaliland (modern Djibouti). The French commander, Brigadier-General Paul Legentilhomme, had some 7,000 men in seven battalions of Senegalese and Somali infantry. Legentilhomme also had three batteries of field guns, four batteries of anti-aircraft guns, a company of light tanks, four companies of militia and irregulars, two platoons of camel corps, and an assortment of aircraft. But, after the fall of France in June 1940, the Vichy French government's neutrality allowed the Italians to shift their focus to the more lightly defended British Somaliland.[23]
On 18 June 1940, Legentilhomme left French Somaliland and joined the Free French. But French Somaliland, the colony Legentilhomme once commanded, remained Vichy until 28 December 1942.[24]
On 3 August 1940, approximately 25,000 Italian troops invaded British Somaliland. The Italians were commanded by General Guglielmo Nasi.[25]
The Italian force attacking British Somaliland in August included five colonial brigades, three Blackshirt battalions, and three bands (banda) of native troops.[26] The Italians had armoured vehicles (a small number of both light and medium tanks), artillery, and, for the moment, superior air support.
The Italians were opposed by a British contingent of about four-thousand men consisting of the Somaliland Camel Corps (commanded by Colonel Arthur Reginald Chater), elements of the 2nd (Nyasaland) Battalion King's African Rifles (KAR) and the 1st Battalion Northern Rhodesian Regiment, the 3rd Battalion 15th Punjab Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion Black Watch.[27][28]
The Italians advanced in three columns, with the western column advancing towards Zeila, the central column towards Hargeisa, and the eastern column towards Odweina in the south. Lieutenant-General Carlo De Simone commanded the strong central column. Colonel Chater, used his camel corps to skirmish with and screen against the advancing Italians as the other British and Commonwealth forces pulled back towards Tug Argan.
On 5 August, within two days of the invasion, the towns of Zeila and Hargeisa were taken. The occupation of Zeila effectively sealed British Somaliland off from French Somaliland. Odweina fell the following day and the Italian central and eastern columns combined to launch attacks against the main British and Commonwealth positions at Tug Argan.
On 7 August the British and Commonwealth forces in British Somaliland received reinforcements with the arrival of the 1st Battalion 2nd Punjab Regiment.[28] On 11 August, a new commander, Major-General Reade Godwin-Austen, reached Tug Argan.
But, early on 15 August, Godwin-Austen concluded that further resistance to the Italians would be futile in Tug Argan. He contacted the British Middle East Command headquarters in Cairo, Egypt. Godwin-Austen requested and received permission to withdraw his forces from British Somaliland. The determined effort of the Black Watch battalion, which covered the retreat, allowed the entire British and Commonwealth contingent to withdraw to Berbera with reduced losses. By 17 August, most of the contingent was successfully evacuated from Berbera to Aden. Rather than evacuate, the Somaliland Camel Corps was disbanded.
On 19 August 1940, the Italians took control of Berbera and then moved down the coast to complete their conquest of British Somaliland. The British colony was annexed to Italian East Africa.[29]
British and Commonwealth losses in the short campaign were relatively low:[30]
By contrast, the Italians losses were almost ten times that of the British:
The British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, criticized General Archibald Wavell concerning the loss of British Somaliland. It was Wavell's Middle East Command which was responsible for the loss of the colony. Because of the low casualty rate, Churchill fretted that the British had abandoned the colony without enough of a fight.
In response to this criticism, Wavell claimed that Somaliland was a textbook withdrawal in the face of superior numbers. He pointed out to Churchill that "A bloody butcher’s bill is not the sign of a good tactician." According to Churchill's staff, Wavell's retort moved Churchill to greater fury than they had ever seen before.[31]
The conquest of the British Somaliland was the only campaign Italy achieved victory in without the support of other Axis troops during World War II.
The main insights from this campaign are the following:
The Italian Red Sea Flotilla saw early action as they attempted to make their presence known. But they introduced themselves at a high cost. In mid to late June, four of the eight submarines based in Massawa were lost.
On 15 June, the Italian submarine Macalle ran aground and was a total loss.
On 16 June 1940, the Italian submarine Galileo Galilei sank the Norwegian tanker James Stove approximately 12 miles (19 km) south of Aden. On 18 June, the Galileo Galilei captured the Yugoslav steamship Dravo but, in the end, released it. On 19 June, the Galileo Galilei was on patrol off of Aden and encountered the armed trawler Moonstone. During a gun duel, the commander of the Galileo Galilei was killed, and the submarine was then captured by the armed trawler.
On 23 June, in the Gulf of Aden but off of French Somaliland, the Italian submarine "Evangelista Toricelli" was sunk by the British destroyers Kandahar and Kingston with assistance from the sloop Shoreham. During this action, the British destroyer Khartoum suffered an internal explosion and sank in shallow water off Perim Island. The British destroyer was a total loss.
Later on 23 June, the Italian submarine Luigi Galvani sank the Indian patrol sloop Pathan in the Indian Ocean. However, on 24 June, the Luigi Galvani was sunk by the sloop Falmouth in the Gulf of Oman.
During the time between the Italian conquest of British Somaliland and the Allied counter-offensive, much attention shifted to the naval sphere and to the activities of the Italian Red Sea Flotilla. Fuel and parts shortages continued to hamper the ability of the Italian flotilla to interfere with either convoys or even individual vessels of the vessels of the British Eastern Fleet.
On 13 August, the Italian submarine Gauleo Ferraras tried to intercept the British battleship Royal Sovereign in the Red Sea. Royal Sovereign, coming from Suez, escaped the Italian ambush and made it safely to Aden.
On 6 September, the Italian submarine Guglielmo waited for prey south of the Farasan Islands. The Guglielmo succeeded in torpedoing and sinking only one ship, the oil tanker Atlas.
Between 20 October and 21 October, the Italian submarines Guglielmo and Gauleo Ferraras tried to intercept a large British Red Sea convoy coming from the Indian Ocean and sailing to Port Sudan and Suez. The BN7 convoy included 31 cargo vessels escorted by the New Zealand cruiser Leander the British destroyer Kimberley and five sloops. The convoy also had an air escort provided by 50 fighters and bombers based in Aden. The Guglielmo and Gauleo Ferraras did not succeed in intercepting the convoy. Later, the same convoy was intercepted and attacked by three Italian destroyers.
On 21 November, the British Red Sea convoy BN7 was attacked by the Italian destroyers Pantera, Leone and Francesco Nullo' The convoy escorts drove the Italian destroyers off. Two of the convoy escorts, the New Zealand cruiser Leander and the British destroyer Kimberley drove the Italian destroyer Francesco Nullo ashore with their combined gunfire. The Francesco Nullo was destroyed the next day by Royal Air Force (RAF) Blenheim light bombers.
The Indian 5th Infantry Division started to arrive in the Sudan in early September 1940. Soon after, a surprise attack was staged to take back Gallabat. The attacking force comprised William "Bill" Slim's Indian 10th Infantry Brigade of the Indian 5th Infantry Division. Slim was accompanied by a squadron of 12 medium and light tanks, a field regiment of artillery, and supported by the RAF.[32] The attack began with the successful capture of Gallabat on 6 November. This was followed by an assault on Metemma, on the other side of the ravine forming the border.
Lieutenant-General Luigi Frusci, acting Governor of Eritrea and commander of the Italian forces there, was not prepared to relinquish the Italian-held positions in the Sudan. The Italian defenders occupied strong prepared positions and, once Slim's attack began, were supported by a fierce onslaught from the counter-attacking Italian Royal Air Force (Regia Aeronautica). Italian aircraft appeared from Gondar in great strength. The Italian airmen shot down seven RAF Gloster Gladiators whilst losing five Fiat CR-42s and, for forty-eight hours, proceeded to methodically bomb the 1st Battalion Essex Regiment and the 3rd Battalion 18th Royal Garwhal Rifles. The Italians did this until the British and Commonwealth troops were compelled to withdraw from the positions they had just won. The 10th Indian Brigade re-occupied the ridge west of Gallabat three days later but the operation against Metemma was not continued.[33]
For the next two months, the 10th Indian Brigade and, after them, the 9th Indian Brigade (who relieved the 10th Brigade in December) simulated the activities of a full division. The brigades blazed lines of communication east from Gedaref and created dummy airfields and stores depots to convince Italian Intelligence that Platt's main thrust would be towards Gondar rather than Kassala.[34]
On 16 October, Gazelle Force was created in the Sudan as a mobile reconnaissance and fighting force. It comprised three motor machine-gun companies from the Sudan Defence Force, the 1st Duke of York's Own Skinner's Horse (the reconnaissance regiment from the Indian 5th Infantry Division), and some mobile artillery. Gazelle Force was commanded by Colonel Frank Messervy.[35]
Throughout November, December, and early January, Lieutenant-General William Platt continued to apply constant pressure on the Italians all along the border with the Sudan. He applied this pressure by continuous patrolling and raiding with both his ground troops and his air force. During this time, better British aircraft started to replace some of the older models. The British and Commonwealth air forces were now starting to get Hawker Hurricanes and more Gloster Gladiators. The Hurricanes were superior to the Italian Fiat CR-42 fighters and the Gladiators were at least their equal. Both the Hurricanes and the Gladiators were capable of playing havoc with Italian Savoia-Marchetti bombers.
On 6 December, a large concentration of Italian motor transport was bombed and strafed by Commonwealth aircraft a few miles north of Kassala. The same aircraft then proceeded to machine-gun from low level the nearby positions of the Italian Blackshirts and colonial infantry. A few days later, the same aircraft bombed the Italian base at Keru, fifty miles east of Kassala. The Commonealth pilots had the satisfaction of seeing supply dumps, stores, and transport enveloped in flame and smoke as they flew away.
One morning in mid-December, a force of Italian fighters paid a visit to a Rhodesian landing-strip near Kassala. The Italians strafed some Hawker Hardys caught on the ground. As a result of the Italian attack, several aircraft were destroyed. However, while successful, the attack resulted in no casualties.
After the conquest of British Somaliland, the Italians adopted a more defensive posture. Throughout late 1940, the setbacks suffered by Italian forces elsewhere in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Western Desert, in the skies over Britain, and on the Albanian border with Greece prompted the new Italian Chief-of-the-General-Staff in Rome, General Ugo Cavallero, to adopt a new course of action in East Africa. In December 1940, Cavallero argued to the Italian High Command (Commando Supremo) that the Italian forces in East Africa should abandon offensive actions against the Sudan and against the Suez Canal. Instead, Cavallero argued that Italy should focus on defending the Italian East African Empire.[36]
Amedeo, Duke of Aosta, also requested permission to withdraw from the Sudanese frontier. In response to Cavallero and the Duke of Aosta, the Italian Supreme Command (Commando Supremo) in Rome issued orders for the Italian forces in East Africa to withdraw to better defensive positions.
Orders were sent to Lieutenant-General Luigi Frusci for him to withdraw his forces from Kassala and Metemma in the lowlands along the Sudanese border with Eritrea. Instead, Frusci was ordered to hold the more easily defended mountain passes on the roads running eastward from Kassala to Agordat and from Metemma to Gondar. However, Frusci chose not withdraw from the lowland. He argued that withdrawal would involve too great a loss of prestige. Furthermore, Kassala was an important railway junction. By holding it, the Italians prevented the British from using the railway to carry supplies from Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast to the base at Gedaref.[36]
Information of the Italian withdrawal was quickly decrypted by the British and, knowing the Italian plans, Lieutenant-General William Platt was able to start his offensive into Eritrea on 18 January 1941, three weeks ahead of schedule.[37]
After the fall of British Somaliland, General Archibald Wavell's plan for the counter-offensive by British and Commonwealth forces included a "northern front" led by Lieutenant-General William Platt and a "southern front" led by Lieutenant-General Alan Cunningham. A third front would be created by the forces which re-took British Somaliland by sea.
Simply put, Wavell planned for Platt to advance southward from the Sudan, through Eritrea, and into Ethiopia and for Cunningham to advance northwards from Kenya, through Italian Somaliland, and into Ethiopia. While Platt advanced from the north and Cunningham from the south, Wavell planned for a third force to be landed in British Somaliland in an amphibious assault and to then re-take that colony prior to advancing into Ethiopia. According to the plan, all three forces were to ultimately join forces at the capital of Italian East Africa, Addis Ababa.
The capture of Italian East Africa would remove land-based threats to supplies and reinforcements coming from Australia, India, South Africa, and British East Africa and passing through the Suez Canal for the campaign in North Africa and open the overland route from Cape Town to Cairo.
On 18 January 1941, Emperor Selassie crossed the border near the village of Um Iddla. Two days later he joined Gideon Force which was already in Ethiopia. The standard of the Lion of Judah was raised again.[38]
The crossing was made some 450 miles (720 km) northwest of Addis Ababa, the capital Emperor Salassie had been forced to flee when the Italian General Pietro Badoglio captured the city from the Ethiopians on 5 May 1936 during the Second Italo-Abyssinian War.
Emperor Selassie and Gideon Force under Major Orde Wingate conducted a campaign for the next three months in the Ethiopian province of Gojjam where they initially faced opposing forces of about 25,000 men.[39] Emperor Selassie and Gideon Force rallied Ethiopian patriots wherever they went using powerful loudspeakers which had been supplied to the patriot forces to announce the presence of the emperor and inducing local tribal leaders and Italian askaris to desert the Italian cause.[39] Using surprise and bluff, this relatively small force disrupted Italian supply lines and provided important intelligence to the more conventional British and Commonwealth forces.
In March, there was a furious clash between Colonel Daniel Sandford and Wingate. Sandford maintained in a signal to headquarters in Khartoum that the resources being absorbed by Wingate for the "comparatively slow advance of [his] conventional forces" was "paralysing Patriot activities by diverting rifles, ammunition and pack saddles exclusively to Wingate's force, instead of giving equal priority to the Patriots" which would have a greater impact through swift and dispersed action not just in Gojjam but with the assistance of Mission 101, in other provinces as well. This was followed by a signal of rebuttal from Wingate to Platt who had to rebuke them both.[40] The dispute overflowed into Wingate's formations leading to the mutiny of the 2nd Ethiopian Battalion at the start of April. Wingate had to leave his sick-bed (he was suffering from an attack of malaria) to dismiss the battalion's commander, after which it rallied to its new leader and performed well for the rest of the campaign.[41]
On 6 March 1941, Ethiopia's "Patriots" won their first victory when they took Bure. There was no resistance. Bombed by the Royal Air Force and besieged by Sudanese and Ethiopian irregular forces, the 6,000-man Italian garrison had slipped out in the night. The Italians in Burye had resisted for a week. But an attack on their communications by the guerrilla leader Haile Yusuf forced them to withdraw. However, the Italians did destroy one Ethiopian battalion blocking their retreat.[citation needed]
The American United Press Agency reported:[citation needed] "The East African war has turned into a race to Addis Ababa between the army of Abyssinian volunteers and the mechanised South African troops who stand in such remarkable contrast to each other. The South African troops are advancing from Mogadishu toward Harar, which lies about 30 miles (48 km) from the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway line."
In less than three months, Gideon force and an ever growing army of Ethiopian patriots were advancing on the Italian fortifications at Debre Marqos, the capital of Gojjam. Because of the critical situation to the south the Duke of Aosta ordered the withdrawal from Debre Marqos and on 4 April 12,000 people (including 4,000 women) under their commander, Colonel Maraventano, began the 200-mile (320 km) trek to Safartak and then beyond to Dessie. On 6 April Hailie Selassie entered Debre Marqos and was formally greeted by Wingate, Gideon Force and Ras Hailu the powerful local patriot leader.[42]
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