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The Third Battle of Chattanooga (popularly known as The Battle of Chattanooga, and including the Battle of Lookout Mountain and the Battle of Missionary Ridge) was fought November 23–25, 1863, in the American Civil War. By defeating the Confederate forces of Gen. Braxton Bragg, Union Army Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant eliminated the last Confederate control of Tennessee and opened the door to an invasion of the Deep South, leading to the Atlanta Campaign of 1864.
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After their disastrous defeat at the Battle of Chickamauga, the 40,000 men of the Union Army of the Cumberland under Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans retreated to Chattanooga, Tennessee. Confederate General Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee besieged the city, threatening to starve the Union forces into surrender. His pursuit to the city outskirts had been leisurely, giving the Union soldiers time to prepare defenses. Bragg's troops established themselves on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, both of which had excellent views of the city, the Tennessee River (which flows through the city), and the Union's supply lines. Confederate artillery atop Lookout Mountain controlled access by the river, and Confederate cavalry launched raids on all supply wagons heading toward Chattanooga, which made it necessary for the Union to find another way to feed their men.
The Union government, alarmed by the potential for defeat, sent reinforcements. On October 17, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant received command of the Western armies, designated the Military Division of the Mississippi; he moved to reinforce Chattanooga and replaced Rosecrans with Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas. Devising a plan known as the "Cracker Line", Grant's chief engineer, Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith, launched a surprise amphibious landing at Brown's Ferry (an action sometimes called the Battle of Brown's Ferry) on October 27 that opened the Tennessee River by linking up Thomas's Army of the Cumberland with a relief column of 20,000 troops from the Eastern Theater's Army of the Potomac, led by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, thus allowing supplies and reinforcements to flow into Chattanooga, greatly increasing the chances for Grant's forces. In response, Bragg ordered Confederate Lt. Gen. James Longstreet to force the Federals out of Lookout Valley. The ensuing Battle of Wauhatchie (October 28–29) was one of the war's few battles fought exclusively at night. The Confederates were repulsed, and the Cracker Line was secured.
Grant's Military Division of the Mississippi assembled the following forces at Chattanooga:[2]
Bragg's Army of Tennessee had the following forces available in Chattanooga:[3]
On October 31, Bragg seriously weakened his forces by sending Longstreet's Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet (divisions of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws and Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood), against Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside near Knoxville. On November 22, Bragg further weakened his forces by ordering the division of Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner to reinforce Longstreet at Knoxville.
When Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman arrived with his 20,000 men of the Army of the Tennessee in mid-November, Grant began offensive operations. His first step was to order an assault from his then headquarters at Fort Wood, just outside what were then the city limits of Chattanooga, against the Confederate forward outposts on top of Orchard Knob and the adjacent Indian Hill and Brushy Knob on November 23 (which some historians refer to as the Battle of Orchard Knob, though it was really a minor skirmish). Orchard Knob provided a more forward and more central point from which to direct the action that followed the next two days. Incredibly, on this same day, Bragg ordered the division of Patrick Cleburne, considered by many of his contemporaries to be the most effective division commander of either side throughout the war, to follow that of Buckner to Knoxville.
The plan for November 24 was a two-pronged attack—Hooker against the Confederate left at Lookout Mountain, Sherman the right at the northern end of Missionary Ridge. Hooker had three divisions, John W. Geary's (XII Corps), Charles Cruft's (XIV Corps) and Peter J. Osterhaus's (XV Corps). The advance of Cruft and Osterhaus stalled at Lookout Creek, but Geary crossed the stream unopposed further south and found that the defile between the mountain and the river had not been secured. The Union troops were opposed by Edward Cary Walthall's brigade of Benjamin F. Cheatham's division (temporarily under the command of John K. Jackson). Geary swept northeast along the base of Lookout Mountain and pushed Walthall's badly outnumbered men back to the Cravens House, just below the northern end of the mountain.[4] The men of John C. Brown's Confederate brigade on the mountain top found themselves powerless to intervene in the battle raging below the cliffs. Geary's success allowed the other two divisions to cross the creek and gobble up the Confederate skirmishers in front of them. John C. Moore brought his brigade up around 1:00 pm to become embroiled in a fight with Geary and Walter C. Whitaker's brigade of Cruft's division.[5] Moore was pushed back and soon joined by Edmund Pettus's brigade. By about 3:00 pm, thick fog enveloped the mountain. The two sides blazed away blindly in the fog the rest of the afternoon but few men were hit. During the fight, Hooker sent a stream of "alternate whimpering and blustering" messages to Grant, but got it exactly right when he predicted, "In all probability the enemy will evacuate tonight."[6] Realizing the battle was lost, Bragg ordered the position abandoned. At midnight the fog cleared and, under a lunar eclipse, the divisions of Carter L. Stevenson and Cheatham retreated behind Chattanooga Creek, burning the bridges behind them.
Sherman's remaining three divisions crossed the Tennessee River successfully, then took what the general thought, due to faulty intelligence, was the north end of Missionary Ridge but was actually a completely separate rise known as Goat Hill (thereafter called "Billy" Goat Hill in mockery of William Sherman's blunder). The division of Patrick Cleburne was recalled to the scene, literally just as the soldiers were boarding their train at Tyner Station on the East Tennessee & Virginia Railroad to the east, and rushed in to reinforce the Confederate right flank at Tunnel Hill (so-called because of the Chattanooga, Harrison, Georgetown, and Charleston Railroad Tunnel passing through it) on the north end of the ridge. No attack occurred on this flank on November 24.
That night Bragg asked his two corps commanders whether to retreat or to stand and fight. William J. Hardee counseled retreat, but John C. Breckinridge convinced Bragg to fight it out on the strong position of Missionary Ridge.[7] Accordingly, the troops withdrawn from Lookout Mountain were ordered to the right wing. From north to south, the Confederate divisions were arranged in the order, Cleburne, Stevenson, States Rights Gist, Cheatham, J. Patton Anderson, William B. Bate and Alexander P. Stewart.[8] Alexander W. Reynolds's brigade stood between Anderson and Bate, Joseph H. Lewis's brigade (Bate) was attached to Cleburne and Marcus J. Wright's brigade (Cheatham) guarded the right rear. The normal corps organization was waived and the four most northerly divisions were placed under Hardee's supervision while Breckinridge commanded the other three.
On November 25, Grant changed his plan and called for a double envelopment by Sherman and Hooker. Thomas was to advance after Sherman reached Missionary Ridge from the north. The Ridge was a formidable defensive position, manned in depth, and Grant believed that a frontal assault against it would be suicidal, unless it could be arranged in support of the flanking attacks by Sherman and Hooker. As the morning progressed, Sherman was unable to break Cleburne's line, and Hooker's advance was slowed by the burned bridges on the creek. About 3:00 p.m., the troops defending Tunnel Hill charged down the steep slopes, routing Sherman's forces and driving them back to Billy Goat Hill.
With only his division plus two brigades and two regiments on loan from other divisions, Cleburne had held out against two corps of Sherman's Army of the Tennessee (that of Peter J. Osterhaus was with Hooker), Howard's corps of the Army of the Potomac, and the divisions of Jefferson C. Davis and of Absalom Baird of the Army of the Cumberland. According to Cleburne, only one brigade, one regiment, and two batteries of his command actually did most of the fighting. For the remainder of the war, his regiment carried battle honors for "Tunnel Hill, Tn." on the blue unit flags unique to his division.
At 3:30 p.m., Grant was concerned that Bragg was reinforcing his right flank at Sherman's expense. Hence, he ordered Thomas to move forward and seize the Confederate line of rifle pits on the valley floor, and stop there to await further orders rather than continuing their assault against the rifle pits (the then current term for trenches) midway up the side of Missionary Ridge and those along the crest. The Union soldiers moved forward and quickly pushed the Confederates from the first line of rifle pits but were then subjected to a punishing fire from the two remaining Confederate lines up the ridge. Most of Thomas's troops had been at the disastrous loss at Chickamauga and had suffered taunts by Sherman's and Hooker's newly arrived forces. Now they were under fire from above with no apparent plan to advance or move back.
At this point, the Union soldiers continued the attack against the remaining lines, seeing refuge in the blind spot near the crest of the ridge left by the fact that the top line of rifle pits were on the actual rather than what is now considered the military crest. This second advance was taken up by the commanders on the spot, but also by some of the soldiers who, on their own, sought shelter from the fire further up the slope.[9] The Union advance was disorganized but effective; finally overwhelming and scattering what ought to have been, as Gen. Grant himself believed, an impregnable Confederate line. As such, the Army of the Cumberland's ascent of Missionary Ridge was one of the war's most dramatic events. A Union officer remembered that
little regard to formation was observed. Each battalion assumed a triangular shape, the colors at the apex. ... [a] color-bearer dashes ahead of the line and falls. A comrade grasps the flag. ... He, too, falls. Then another picks it up ... waves it defiantly, and as if bearing a charmed life, he advances steadily towards the top ...[10][11]
By 4:30 p.m., the center of Bragg's line had broken completely and fled in panic, requiring the abandonment of Missionary Ridge and a headlong retreat eastward to the Chickamauga River (also known as South Chickamauga Creek). The sole exception to the panicked flight was Cleburne's command, his division augmented by two brigades from another division, which at the time of the collapse had just sat down to eat after their victory over the Army of the Tennessee (Watkins); as the only command not in complete disarray, it was the last unit to withdraw and formed the rearguard of Bragg's entire army as it retreated eastward.
At around 2:30 p.m., Grant spoke with Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, a classmate of his from West Point. "General Sherman seems to be having a hard time," he observed. Wood replied, "Yes, General, he does seem to be in a warm place." Grant responded, "It does seem as if he is having a hard time, and it seems as if we ought to go help him."[12] The two talked some more and Grant apparently made up his mind to send Wood's and Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan's divisions against the Confederate rifle pits at the base of the ridge. Grant then suggested his idea to Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas. For some reason, relations between Grant and Thomas were chilly. Thomas rebuffed Grant's idea. Meanwhile, IV Corps commander Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger was nearby, completely absorbed in the activities of a battery of artillery.
Irritated, Grant asked Thomas to order Granger to "take command of his own corps. And now order your troops to advance and take the enemy's first line of rifle pits."[13] Thomas passed the order to Granger. It was about 3:00 p.m. Incredibly, Granger ignored his orders and went back to commanding the battery of artillery. After a further scolding from Grant, Granger finally issued orders to Wood and Sheridan. Messengers also went to Brig. Gens. Absalom Baird and Richard W. Johnson who belonged to Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer's XIV Corps. Granger's orders to Wood were, "The movement is to be made at once, so give your orders to your brigade commanders immediately, and the signal to advance will be the rapid, successive discharge of the six guns of the battery."[14]
From left to right, the divisions were Baird, Wood, Sheridan and Johnson, 23,000 men in total. Each division had three brigades, except Johnson, who had only two on hand. The brigades were all deployed in line, that is, side by side. In order from left to right, the brigades were led by Col. Edward H. Phelps, Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer, Brig. Gen. John B. Turchin, Brig. Gen. Samuel Beatty, Brig. Gen. August Willich, Brig. Gen. William B. Hazen, Brig. Gen. George D. Wagner, Col. Charles G. Harker, Col. Francis T. Sherman, Col. William L. Stoughton and Brig. Gen. William P. Carlin. Each brigade consisted of two lines, one behind the other, with skirmishers leading the way.
Grant's order to halt at the rifle pits at the base of the ridge was misunderstood by far too many of the generals charged with executing it. Some doubted the order because they thought it absurd to stop an attack at the instant when the attackers would be most vulnerable to fire from the crest and to a counterattack. Others apparently received garbled versions of the order.[15]
At about 3:40 p.m.,[16] the signal guns fired before Baird could brief Turchin. Some regimental officers claimed to get conflicting orders from the same brigadier. When asked where he was to stop, Willich told one officer, "I don't know, at Hell, I expect."[17] Sheridan sent an orderly back to Granger requesting whether the objective was the base or the top of the ridge, but the signal guns fired before he got an answer. Wagner, Turchin and Carlin thought they were supposed to carry the ridge top. Most officers were guided only by what the units on either side of them did.
The Confederates holding the rifle pits at the base of the ridge were also plagued by conflicting orders. Some were ordered to fire a volley then retreat, others to hold their ground. Those who stayed to fight were swamped by Yankee numbers; many were captured. The rest started the long climb to the ridge top in fear of being shot in the back. Those who escaped the Yankees were completely winded by the effort and in no shape to defend themselves for several minutes.
The Confederate cannons hit few of their enemies during the initial Union rush, but once the Northern soldiers stopped at the rifle pits, they began to zero in on them. The Southern riflemen also poured in their fire. Some Union unit commanders moved their men forward to get out of the worst fire. Willich's skirmishers started up the ridge without orders. Deciding that following them was preferable to being massacred in the rifle pits, Willich gave orders to advance, though several of his units were already doing so. Seeing this, Hazen and Beatty ordered their first lines up also. When Wood reached the rifle pits, the second line men begged him to order them up as well. Wood sent them forward.
Grant was shocked when he saw the Union troops climbing the ridge. He asked first Thomas then Granger who had given the orders. Neither general claimed responsibility, but Granger replied, "When those fellows get started all hell can't stop them."[18] Granger then sent a courier to Wood allowing him permission to take the ridge top, if he thought it possible. Several messengers went out at about this time with differing orders, leading to more confusion.
On the far left Phelps and Van Derveer captured the rifle pits and held their position. Having negotiated some rough ground, Turchin's brigade lagged behind. But as soon as his men overran the rifle pits, the "Mad Russian" immediately urged his men up the ridge. Before Baird could send his other two brigades, he received an order to halt.
Wagner's and Harker's men started climbing soon after Wood's brigades. Wagner got halfway up before he received an order that he was to stop at the base of the ridge. He ordered his men to to pull back. As they did, they suffered heavy losses from the elated Confederate defenders.[19] When Wagner and some of Harker's men returned to the rifle pits they saw that Wood's division on their left and units of their own division on the right were still moving uphill. Disgusted that a rival division was getting ahead, Wagner sent his second line up the ridge. Sheridan soon ordered Harker back up also. To their right, Francis Sherman's brigade faced an entrenched line about one-half of the way up the ridge and had hard going. On the far right, Johnson's two brigades faced determined resistance at the rifle pits and were slow in starting up the ridge.
The Confederate line first cracked at Bird's Mill Road, at about 5:00 p.m.[20] One of Willich's regiments, joined by two of Hazen's, worked its way within 50 yards of the Rebel breastworks. Protected by a roll of ground, they crept closer, then with a rush they leaped over the works belonging to William F. Tucker's brigade. Surprised, the nearest defenders surrendered or fled for their lives. Alertly, the Union field officers swung their regiments to the right and left and began rolling up the Confederate line. Tucker bravely rallied his men, but by this time Willich and Hazen's men were flooding over the breastworks.
Since Bragg had not provided for a tactical reserve, his defenses were only a thin crust. To seal off the breach, the Southern generals were placed on the horns of a dilemma. When they found Union troops on their flank, they had to pull regiments out of their defense line for a counterattack. This weakened the main line of resistance just as the Union brigades to their front were swarming up to the crest.
Once atop the ridge, Hazen swung his brigade south. The Rebel lines in this direction were held by Alexander W. Reynolds's brigade, whose men had to endure a hard climb from the base of the ridge. Hit in front and flank, most of Reynolds's tired men melted away. Continuing south, Hazen flanked Col. R. C. Tyler's brigade of Bate's division out of position, allowing Wagner's brigade to reach the crest. Bate's Florida brigade was soon driven away, allowing Harker's men to reach the top. R. L. Gibson's brigade was defeated by Francis Sherman's men. Dogged by tough resistance and very steep slopes, Johnson's two brigades took the longest to climb the ridge, Carlin's men finally reaching the top around 5:30 pm. Seeing that his position was hopeless, Stewart pulled the brigades of Otho F. Strahl and Marcellus A. Stovall off the ridge.
Meanwhile, Willich wheeled to the north and began crushing the flank of Anderson's division. Willich's success assisted Beatty's brigade to get to the top. The two brigades first drove off Arthur M. Manigault's men and continued rolling north. As they came up the ridge, the Union brigades of Turchin, Van Derveer and Phelps (who was killed near the crest) added their weight to the assault against the Confederate brigades of Zachariah C. Deas, Alfred J. Vaughan and John K. Jackson. Some Rebel soldiers resisted stubbornly, but many men panicked and ran when they realized that Union troops were bearing down on them from the flank. Often, the Southern infantry fled before the supporting artillerists could escape with their cannon. In this manner, Anderson's entire division and Cheatham's left flank brigades of Brig. Gens. Jackson and Moore were routed. The northward Federal advance was only stopped by the stout fighting of Walthall's brigade and nightfall. Cheatham, Gist, Stevenson and Cleburne were able to get their divisions away more or less intact, though the Rebel soldiers were demoralized or chagrined by their defeat.
Only Sheridan tried to pursue beyond Missionary Ridge, but he finally gave up late that night when it was clear that he was not being supported by either Granger or Thomas.
Breckinridge was absent while the Northern attack wrecked his corps. Worried about his left flank, Breckinridge rode to the end of his line in the early afternoon. At 3:30 p.m., about the time Thomas launched his four-division attack on Missionary Ridge, the corps commander reined in behind Stewart's left flank brigade of Col. J. T. Holtzclaw. The Confederate brigadier pointed to the southwest where Hooker's men were busily bridging Chattanooga Creek. Concerned about Rossville Gap, which lay undefended beyond his left flank, Breckinridge ordered Holtzclaw to send a couple of regiments to hold the position. It was too late; by the time the Southerners reached the gap, the division of Osterhaus had already marched through. Cabell Breckinridge, the general's son, rode into a group of Union soldiers and was captured.[21]
When Osterhaus notified his superior officer of his success, Hooker quickly faced his troops to the north and organized a three-pronged attack. He sent Osterhaus along a trail east of Missionary Ridge, Cruft onto the ridge itself and Geary along the western face of the ridge. Holtzclaw faced his men south and put up a fight, but Cruft and Osterhaus soon began herding the outnumbered Rebels north along Missionary Ridge. Hearing a tremendous racket to the north, Breckinridge finally rode off to find out what was wrong. As Holtzclaw retreated before Hooker's command, he eventually bumped into Col. Anson G. McCook's 2nd Ohio of Carlin's brigade, now astride the ridge. Surrounded by superior forces on four sides, approximately 700 of Holtzclaw's men surrendered.[22]
During the night, Bragg ordered his army to withdraw toward Chickamauga Station on the Western & Atlantic Railroad (currently the site of Lovell Air Field) and the following day began retreating from there toward Dalton, Georgia, in two columns taking two routes. During the retreat, minor battles were fought at Chickamauga Station, at Shepherd's Run in Hickory Valley, at Cat Creek (Mackey Branch) in the old Concord (now East Brainerd) community, and at Graysville, Georgia. The date, November 26, was coincidentally the first official American Thanksgiving Day.
The pursuit ordered by Grant was effectively thwarted at the Battle of Ringgold Gap.
Casualties for the Union Army amounted to 5,824 (753 killed, 4,722 wounded, and 349 missing) of about 56,000 engaged; Confederate casualties were 6,667 (361 killed, 2,160 wounded, and 4,146 missing, mostly prisoners) of about 44,000. Southern losses may have been higher; Grant claimed 6,142 prisoners. In addition, the Union Army seized 40 cannons and 69 limbers and caissons. When a chaplain asked General Thomas whether the dead should be sorted and buried by state, Thomas replied "Mix 'em up. I'm tired of States' rights."[23]
One of the Confederacy's two major armies was routed. The Union held Chattanooga, the "Gateway to the Lower South." It became the supply and logistics base for Sherman's 1864 Atlanta Campaign, as well as for the Army of the Cumberland (the Army of the Ohio was based in Knoxville while the Army of the Tennessee was based in Nashville), and Grant had won his final battle in the West prior to receiving command of all Union armies in March 1864.
Grant was initially furious that his orders had not been followed exactly. Thomas was taken by surprise as well, knowing that he would be blamed if the assault failed. But it succeeded. Bragg has often been criticized for his placement of the rifle pits (trenches) along the actual crest of the ridge rather than the military crest, but at the time trench warfare was new to North America and to military doctrine in general, and there was no clear protocol about such crests. The rifle pits dug by Sherman's troops on Billy Goat Hill were also placed along the actual crest. Bragg is, however, clearly to blame for the belated construction (not ordered until the day the Army of the Cumberland took Orchard Knob) of the Confederates' rifle pits and for spreading them out in three thin and poorly defended lines, which led to further chaos as his soldiers falling back from the first two lines of rifle pits swarmed over the crest with the Federal troops on their heels.
